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The Allocation of Prosecution: An Economic Analysis
Legal systems include a wide variety of behavior-controlling
laws. Violations of such laws are generally classified as torts (e.g.,
noncriminal defamation), crimes (e.g., drug offenses), or both torts
and crimes (e.g., battery and criminal fraud). Two principal aims
of a legal system are the punishment and deterrence of those who
commit crimes or ,torts (offenders), and the redress of injuries suffered by crime or tort victims. In attempting to redress injuries, legal systems create causes of action and establish courts to adjudicate
the actions so that the victims themselves can seek peaceful redress.
In attempting to punish and deter, legal systems rely upon "prosecutors" to bring actions against offenders.
For legal wrongs that are noncriminal, .the "prosecutor" is the
victim, and the method of prosecution is the action brought by the
victim to seek redress. The offender is punished by being forced
to reimburse the victim, and potential offenders are deterred by the
possibility that the victims of any future offenses will bring actions
against them. For wrongs •that are criminal, the government prosecutes the offender in an action to punish the offender and deter the
commission of future offenses. This action is generally separate
from the action available to the victim, if any, to seek redress. 1
This Note uses economic theory to reassess the division of prosecutorial tasks between victims and the government for offenses other
than victimless offenses. It attempts to answer in a general manner
questions such as why the prosecutor should differ from offense to
offense and where ,the line should be drawn between governmental
and individual prosecution. Work done in the areas of welfare economics and public finance concerning the effectiveness of government and the private sector in providing different sorts of goods is
drawn upon heavily. This Note views prosecution as an economic
good and a victim's prosecution of an offender as a market activity.
First, it delineates an economic theory of prosecution and constructs
two models for distinguishing offenses on the basis of their suitability
for public prosecution or for public subsidy of individual prosecution.
Then, the conclusions drawn from these models are employed to determine whether five common offenses are better suited for governmental rather than individual prosecution.

I.

THE ECONOMIC THEORY

Welfare economics is a normative discipline that attempts to de1. This Note assumes that, as a general rule, all offenses currently prosecuted
criminally by government could also be prosecuted by the victim. But cf. text at
notes 16-19 infra.
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termine in a detailed manner what improves social welfare in some
sense. One might attempt to make such a determination by accurately comparing individual utilities. For example, one might consider whether, if A is forced to give a dollar to B, B has gained more
than A has lost. Yet such comparisons are difficult to make. To
avoid making them, most economic theory employs a criterion of optimality in social welfare that requires only those resource reallocations that improve the welfare of some individuals without impairing
the welfare of others. An optimal position is reached when no action can be taken to improve the welfare of some individual without
impairing the welfare of others. This criterion, called pareto optimality, is often the sole criterion of efficiency used by economists2
and will be the sole one used in this Note.
It can easily be shown that a perfectly competitive market dealing in purely private goods is efficient by this criterion. 3 "Purely
private goods" are goods, services, or activities that do not generate
externalities. That is, they do not impose costs or benefits on those
not involved in transactions concerning the "goods." When such
costs or benefits are imposed, "externalities" are said to exist. For
instance, external benefits arise when A pays someone to mow his
lawn; his neighbors now live in a neater environment. External
costs occur when B's auto factory emits pollutants into 1he air; those
living around the factory suffer breathing discomfort and long-term
health problems. In each of these examples, costs or benefits arise
that are ex-ternal to the market transactions taking place.
A market in goods that generate externalities is generally inefficient according to the pareto-optimality criterion. This can be demonstrated by the auto factory example. Suppose that it would cost
B $500 in lost profits to stop polluting by shutting down his factory
and that the damage to the people living around the factory from
the pollution totals $1000, $10 apiece for 100 people. The factory's
continued production clearly is not pareto optimal. If the 100 people collectively paid a "bribe" of $500 to B to stop producing, B's
doing so would make them better off without detracting from his
welfare.
The factory's production is nevertheless likely to continue, for
the 100 people are not likely to organize and pay the bribe. Theoretically, each individual should be willing to contribute up to $10
for the bribe. The bribe might therefore be paid if some contribute
more than $5, some contribute less 1:han $5, and some contribute
nothing. But, each individual in the group will realize both that his
failure to contribute his share of the bribe will have little effect on
whether the bribe is paid and that he will benefit the same amount
2. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & R.
1971).
3. Id. at 262-64.

QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY

255-56 (2d ed.
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regardless of whether and how much he pays. Many individuals will
therefore attempt to become "free riders" by not contributing. It
is likely that enough people will attempt to become free riders •that
the bribe will not be paid. A second reason why the bribe is unlikely to be paid is that significant costs would be incurred in organizing the group and attempting to compel each group member to
contribute his share. This "transaction-costs" problem will have particular impact when the group is large or the amount sought from
each contributor is small.
Thus, markets in goods that generate externalities are inefficient.
Because the hypothetical pareto-optimal bribes that would result in
the reduction or cessation of production will not occur, goods that
generate external costs will be overproduced. By similar reasoning,
goods that generate external benefits will be underproduced, since
those who receive the external benefits are unlikely to bribe the producer to increase production: 4 If A's neighbors could bribe him
commensurate with their benefits, he would cut his lawn once a
week; since they do not, he cuts it only once a month.
The obvious alternative to relying upon the market to achieve
pareto optimality is governmental regulation. The government can
compel payment by those who are benefited by an increase or decrease in the production of a good and can thus avoid the free-rider
problem. Ideally, by taking into account the external benefits and
costs generated by production, the government can make pareto-optimal decisions concerning the amount of a good that should be produced. But pareto-optimal decisions can be made only if people can
signal their preferences to the government and the government can
aggregate them and make unbiased production decisions. In a sys:tem of representative democracy, there are several reasons why this
cannot occur with any substantial degree of accuracy. First, voters
do not vote on individual issues, but rather express their preferences
for candidates running on platforms of varying degrees of specificity.
Votes are therefore, at best, signals as to a preferred package of
issues and goods. 5 With decisions based upon such vague voting
information, government-managed production may even satisfy individual preferences less accurately than an unregulated market. Second, as Professor Arrow has shown, the decision reached by a majority may arbitrarily depend on the order of voting on the alternative
choices. 6 Strategic voting may therefore occur that results in deci4. See R. MusGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
74-77 (1973).
5. See id. at 92-96.
6. Suppose we have three voters who are voting to choose one of three policies. If
their preferences follow certain patterns, and if voting is done in sequential pairs with
majority rule deciding, then the order of voting may determine which policy wins.
Suppose voter X prefers policy A over policy B over policy C, voter Y prefers C to
A to B, and voter Z prefers B to C to A. If a vote is taken on A versus B, A wins
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sions that do not reflect voter preferences. 7 Finally, since it is impossible to tax individuals according 1:o the level of benefits they receive from governmental spending, the provision of goods by the
government will inevitably result in the redistribution of wealth. 8
There are more imperfections resulting from government-managed production, but the above examples make the gist of the argument clear: Market imperfection does not necessarily argue for governmental provision because the governments have their own
drawbacks. A decision whether an economic good should be provided
by government, therefore, should be based on a weighing of the relative imperfections of the two sectors. Yet this weighing is not without difficulty. Questions like "How much are voter preferences distorted by representative democracy?" or "How much misallocation
is there by the private sector?" cannot be answered quantitatively.
Consequently, no clear-cut answer can be given when one asks
whether the production level of any specific good should be established by the government.
When a question arises concerning the production of goods that
are largely private but generate some external benefits and costs, it
is often suggested that the appropriate policy is for the goods to be
produced in the market, but for the government to subsidize the producer to the extent of the external benefits and tax the producer to
the extent of the external costs. If this were done, our polluting
factory owner would be taxed $1000; he would then shut down the
plant, and the efficient solution would be achieved. 9 But this approach suffers from the same kinds of problems that render total
government production infeasible. Both approaches are viable only
if individuals can provide signals as to the external costs and benefits
felt by them and only if the government can aggregate and implement these signals in an unbiased manner. Thus, this approach provides no automatic solution to the dilemma.
Where does this leave us? The failures of economic theory do
not make legislators and administrators stop in their tra~ks. Life
and then C prevails over A, so C is the policy chosen. But if we start with B versus
C, B wins, and then A wins over B, so A is the winner. Something as trivial and
arbitrary as voting order has determined the policy chosen. See generally K. ARR.ow,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (1951).
7. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 4, at 92.
8. This last problem results from the nature of taxation rather than from any
defects in representative democracy. Suppose there are three taxpayers who benefit
from government spending by $3, $4 and $5 respectively. As long as each individual's tax burden does not match his benefits from governmental spending, income will
be redistributed. If taxes are greater than benefits, one loses; if less, one wins. Such
redistribution is an analytical problem rather than a practical one. While some
particular redistributions may be desired, characterizations of one situation as better
than another in the pareto-optimal sense is impossible if wealth is distributed
differently in-the two situations. See id. at 83-108.
9. See generally id. at 75-76.
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(and government) goes on, educated guesses are made, and theory
is used to fill in the gaps in empirical knowledge.
This Note attempts some filling in. Two models are developed
in an effort to compare different goods-the prosecution of different
offenses-according to their suitability for governmental provision
and for governmental subsidies to aid private provision. The prosecution of an offense can profitably be viewed as an economic good
because, whether or not successful, it generates benefits and costs
for the prosecutor, the offender, and third parties. These models
will isolate factors that influence an offense's suitability for governmental prosecution. While absolute prescriptions as to the mode of
prosecution for any particular offense are not and cannot be made,
the use of models allows for the ranking of offenses according to
their relative suitability for governmental or private prosecution.
Before constructing the models, two objections to the use of economic theory for this purpose must be considered. One objection
is that this use of economic theory assumes that offenders are "economic men." Economic theory studies individuals who are by hypothesis rational maximizers of their welfare, individuals who weigh
costs and benefits before acting. For the models developed below
to yield fruitful results, however, it is not necessary that offenders
be completely rational maximizers. Indeed, the extent to which offenders match or diverge from the "economic man" notion is a key
variable in one of the models. The models do assume, however,
that even criminals weigh costs and benefits to some degree before
acting and are thus deterred by the prospects of punishment or penalty. If this is not true, economic analysis is of no use.
Whether criminal penalties have a deterrent effect has in the
past been a matter of some controversy, 10 but recent literature offers
a clear conclusion. The work of Andenaes is anecdotal and its aims
limited, but it argues convincingly that at least some deterrence exists.11 His stories of wild outbreaks of criminal behavior during police strikes,12 for instance, make the deterrence hypothesis hard to
refute. The works of Ehrlich and Philips use sophisticated econometric techniques to measure deterrence effects and find some present.13 Ehrlich, using cross-sectional data from different states,
10. Some writers have argued that a large number of criminals are neurotic and
that punishment of offenders therefore bas little deterrent effect. See, e.g., F.
ALExANDER & H. STA~, THE CRIMINAL, TIIE JUDGE AND TIIE PUBLIC 207-09 (1931),
Eysenck says that "it is doubtful whether punishment acts as a very effective
deterrent." H. EYSENCK, CRIME & PERSONALITY 157 (1964). Zimring and Hawkins
believe in the existence of deterrence, but not for all persons in all situations. They
conclude, for instance, that "anti-authoritarian" personalities may view a new threat
as an invitation to defiance. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 123-25 (2d ed.
1973).
11. See J. ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974).
12. Id. at 17, 50-51.
13. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL
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found significant correlation between the probability and severity of
punishment on the one hand and the rate of FBI index crimes on
the other. 14 Given such evidence, one can safely presume that criminals are at least minimally deterred by punishment and thus are at
least minimally rational.
The second objection to this use of economic theory is that prosecution of offenders can be viewed as a market activity only if there
is a possibility of private gain when prosecution is performed by private individuals. To meet this objection, it is assumed that the victim who brings an action to punish and deter can, in the same action,
recover damages for the offense. In order to facilitate the comparison of private and governmental prosecution, it is also assumed that,
if a governmental action is brought, the government will recover and
remit to the victim money damages for injuries suffered by the victim. Finally, it is assumed that, in either case, the court adjudicating the action can impose a fine or prison term on the offender if
appropriate. 15
II.

A MODEL FOR OFFENSES CHARACTERIZED
BY THE EVIDENTIARY PROBLEM

The two models presented in this and the next section assess the
suitability of offenses for governmental prosecution. The first is
simple, unsurprising, and justifies, on economic grounds, governmental prosecution of the core offenses of the criminal law. The
second model, more complex, analyzes the remaining criminal and
tort offenses and suggests a few changes in policy. The easy job
is undertaken first.
Certain offenses are characterized by what may be called the evidentiary problem; that is, the offender's identity is often difficult to
discover unless the offender is apprehended at the scene of the offense, and the details of the crime's commission cannot be determined through the use of ordinary civil discovery and investigative
techniques. Some activities that are prosecuted by the government
as crimes-homicide and larceny, for example-involve the evidentiary problem. Some crimes, such as perjury, do not. Most offenses
STtJD. 259 (1972); Phillips, Crime Control: The Case for Deterrence, in S.
RoTIENBURG, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 65-84 ( 1973).
14. Ehrlich, supra note 13.
15. These assumptions are necessary to isolate the variables that are of concern in
this Note. An offense for which imprisonment is_a particularly appropriate punishment is better suited for governmental rather than private prosecution. See text
following note 20 infra; note 26 infra. On the effect of fines, see notes 22, 26 infra.
The compensation of victims by the government is assumed in order to facilitate
comparisons and because such compensation seems an appropriate and feasible goal
of government. Accordingly, to distinguish governmental and private prosecution on
the ground that victims are only compensated in the latter situation is improper: The
analysis used in this Note should not be affected by what is probably a historical
accident.
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that are solely torts and that currently are prosecuted privately, such
as products liability, defamation, misrepresentation, landowners'
negligence, and most auto accidents, also do not. As demonstrated
below, the presence of the evidentiary problem justifies public provision of police16 and consequently makes governmental prosecution
suitable for offenses characterized by the problem.
The significance of an offense characterized by the evidentiary
problem (EP offense) is that investigators who are capable of using
force are often needed immediately after such an offense has been
committed in order both to effect the immediate apprehension necessary to make prosecution possible and to investigate the details of
the offense. The functions of these investigators, or police, are such
that private agents could not perform them without generating substantial external benefits and other sources of market imperfections.
Suppose that a private company, called upon to prevent BP offenses, provides "police services" for a fee to 250 houses out of a
500-house neighborhood. To be able to arrive quickly at the scene
of a ·crime, the private policemen need to circle the area in patrol
cars. In so doing, they benefit the 250 nonsubscribers. The criminal, seeing a patrol car, does not know which houses belong to subscribers and which do not and is therefore deterred from committing
crimes against nonsubscribers. Also, the private policemen at times
apprehend criminals who have robbed homes of nonsubscribers,
both out of public-spiritedness and on the theory that the criminal's
apprehension helps subscribers since the criminal might strike in the
neighborhood again. This practice also deters the commission of offenses at nonsubscribing houses.
It is thus clear that the private provision of police services to prevent BP offenses in a geographic area generates external benefits
for those in the area who choose not to help support the police. Because these benefits would not be reflected in the market price of
police services, the "production" of police services would be less
than optimal. This market imperfection means that a better case
can be made for governmental prosecution of offenses characterized
by the evidentiary problem than for governmental prosecution of
other offenses.
In several respects, the nature of the costs of police services provides additional support for governmental provision. Private police
must be able to distinguish between calls for aid from subscribers
and nonsubscribers. This must be done quickly if the police are to
operate effectively. This could be done by the installation, in sub16. To be more accurate, a better case can be made for public police to deal with
offenses characterized by the evidentiary problem than can be made for public police
to deal with other offenses. As noted in the text at notes 5-8 supra, the inability to
quantify governmental misallocation renders it impossible to make any absolute
statements concerning the feasibility of governmental provision of police.
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scribers' homes, of communication devices connected to the private
police office, but such devices are costly. Similar methods of distinguishing subscribers from nonsubscribers would also be costly.17 In
short, private police companies, investigating EP offenses, face costs
of excluding nonsubscribers from using their services, costs that
would not be incurred by public police forces. 18 Moreover, the police protection industry is a "natural monopoly'' for a given geographic region because it faces decreasing or even zero marginal
costs for servicing additional customers within the region. A patrol
car circling a neighborhood and servicing some of the homes within
the neighborhood could service other homes at virtually no additional cost. If two police firms each have a squad car patrolling the
area, inefficiencies result. A more efficient system is for one firm
to service the area so that it can direct one squad car to service the
entire area, or, if necessary, two cars to service half the area (or
half of a slightly larger area) each. The existence of these economies of scale makes monopoly "natural'' for a particular area.
Yet, if a firm establishes a monopoly, it may well exploit its position
to achieve exorbitant profits. It is for this reason that natural monopolies, like the police protection industry, traditionally are and
should be government-run or government-regulated.19
Two other factors militate in favor of public police. One factor
is that many of the offenses that present the evidentiary problem
often require the use of force for apprehension. For noneconomic
reasons, it might be desirable to restrict the use of force as much
as possible to agents of the state. The other factor is that investigators might gain the cooperation of witnesses more readily if they are
public rather than private investigators.
In sum, there are economic and noneconomic reasons why government should provide police protection services and, consequently,
why offenses characterized by the evidentiary problem should be investigated by government agents. Theoretically, public police could
investigate such offenses and, upon apprehending the offender and
learning the details of the offense, turn over the information gathered to the victim. The victim could retain a lawyer to prosecute
the offense and perhaps to investigate the offense further and interrogate the police about their actions.
But there are problems with separating the investigative and
prosecutorial tasks associated with a particular offense. Some prob17. Subscribing houses could be identified with stickers, but counterfeiting might
be a problem and the use of stickers might be viewed as irresponsible-as an incitement to crime against nonsubscribers. The cost of producing, distributing, and applying stickers would still be a "cost of exclusion."
18. See generally R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 4, at 53.
19. See generally w. SHEPERD, PuBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 342-48
(1975).
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!ems are purely practical. For example, juggling the schedules of
police officers so that they can testify at ·trials is more easily accomplished by a public prosecutor in daily contact with police officials.
Similarly, some central office is needed to select the offenses on
which the police should expend their limited investigative time since
individual victims, to whom the police services would presumably be
costless, would direct the police to engage in a major investigation
each time. Moreover, coordination problems would arise if the police were required to take orders from different individuals each day.
One problem with separating the investigative and prosecutorial
tasks is considerably more fundamental than these practical considerations. Since government activities are not run on -the profit motive,
noneconomic incentives are necessary to maintain the morale of government personnel. In particular, police presumably must feel that
their work will result in the attainment of justice. 20 If the prosecution function is left to private individuals, police might believe that
they are working only to enrich private lawyers and that the discretionary decision to prosecute criminals will be made on grounds unrelated to justice. The fact that police must feel that they are serving
a public function, rather than merely aiding market activities, is a
persuasive reason for governmental prosecution of offenses that
pose the evidentiary problem.
The conclusion of this first economic model is that BP offenses,
which are by and large the "core" offenses of the criminal law, are
the best cases for governmental prosecution. This conclusion is supported by a few practical considerations. Of all offenders, those
who commit core offenses are perhaps most likely to be indigent.
Many victims will be unwilling to prosecute indigent offenders unless
subsidized by the government for the costs of prosecution because
any damage judgment in their favor would be uncollectible. But,
in subsidizing victims, the government in effect must decide which
offenders should be prosecuted and must pay for the prosecution.
It might well be more economical for the government to prosecute
offenders directly rather than to do so indirectly by subsidizing victims. Moreover, society may determine that, of all offenders, those
who commit BP offenses are most in need of receiving prison terms
rather than some other form of punishment. Because offenders who
are imprisoned are likely to be unable to satisfy damage judgments
entered against them, governmental subsidy of private prosecution
and, hence, governmental prosecution itself, may be required for offenses committed by offenders who are apt to be imprisoned.

ill. A MODEL FOR OTHER CRIMES AND TORTS
The model set forth above explains in a general manner why
20. See generally McDowell, Police as Victims of Their Own Misconceptions, 62
J. CRIM. L. 430,432 (1971).
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offenses characterized by the evidentiary problem are the most appropriate offenses for public rather than private prosecution. The· second model deals with the remaining crimes and torts in a more complex manner. The model has two parts. The first examines the
. determinants of the ratio of private to external benefits from private
prosecution in order to assess the degree to which the free market
errs in allocating resources ,to the prosecution of various offenses.
The first part shows that market error is greatest for offenses the
prosecution of which gives rise to the greatest net external benefits
relative to net private benefits. It also shows that net external benefits are greatest for offenses that are deterred the most by the prosecution of offenders. The second part assesses the degree to which
the government errs in allocating resources to ·the prosecution of various offenses. It demonstrates that the moral stigma associated with
the offense and the political influence of the offender relative to the
political influence of the victim affect governmental error. These
findings are then employed to determine the relative appropriateness
of governmental prosecution for certain offenses.
At the outset, it must be established that the amount of market
error in providing a good varies with the relative weight of the external benefits to the private benefits generated by the good. This
proposition can be demonstrated by the following table (all benefit
figures are net of costs):
Q
2
4
6

12
10
8

3

6

2
1

5

15
12

4

9

18
15
12

The numbers in columns Ba ,through Bt2 represent quantitatively the
benefits generated per unit of some good at quantities 2, 4, and 6
of that good. In particular, the numbers in column Ba represent the
benefits per unit of the good received by party A, the consumer of
the good; the numbers in column Be1 are the external benefits per
unit resulting from the production of the good according to one
measure of external benefits; the numbers in column Be2 are the external benefits per unit resulting from the production of ,the good
according to a second i:p.easure of external benefits. The last two
columns are benefit totals. Bu is derived by adding the quantities
in Bn and Bel, Bt2 is the sum of Bn and Be2,
Where the per unit external benefits generated by the production of the good equal the quantities set forth in column Be1, consumer A, in an optimal setting, will be willing to pay for the good
at the Bu schedule, since those receiving the external benefits will
bribe him to do so. But, as noted above, 21 the existence of the free21. See text at notes 3-4 supra.
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rider and transaction-costs problems will lead him to be willing to pay
only at the Ba schedule. Thus, consumer A will be willing to pay
only 12 per unit for a quantity of 2 units when in an optimal situation
he would be willing to pay 15.
Suppose the market price of the good equals 12. Because A
is willing to buy 2 units at the price of 12 per unit, he will demand
2 units of the good. If the external benefits equaled the Bet schedule and an optimal situation existed, however, consumer A would
have demanded 4 units at a market price of 12 per unit. Because
of market imperfections, therefore, only half the optimal amount is
produced. Alternatively, if external benefits equal the Be2 schedule,
actual demand will still be determined by the Ba schedule, but optimal demand will be determined by the Bt2 schedule. Optimally, A
will demand 6 units at a market price of 12 per unit whereas actually
he will demand only 2 units. Thus, at external benefits equal to
Be2 and a market price of 12, only one third of the optimal amount
is produced.
The results for a market price of 12 are summarized in the following table:
Optimal Production/Actual Production

=

4/2

Ba/Be1 12/3
Ba/Be2 = 12/6

6/2

This table illustrates what should be intuitively obvious. As the external benefits rise relative to the private benefits (from 12/3 to
12/ 6), the actual production of -the good deviates more from the optimal production (from 4/2 to 6/2), and thus the market error in
failing to allocate resources to the production of the good increases.
Alternatively, and more significantly, it can be said that, for two
goods that render the same amount of benefits per unit to consumer
A at a given quantity (that is, they have the same Ba schedule),
there will be less underproduction of the good that generates external benefits at the Bet schedule than of ,the good that generates external benefits at the Be2 schedule. Thus, the relative efficiency of
the market in producing various goods can be determined by comparing the ratio of private benefits to external benefits (Bp/Bo) of
the goods. The higher the BP/Be ratio, :the more accurately the
market allocates resources to the production of the good. 22
22. A more general formulation is easy to develop. Let f 1 be private demand
and / 2 external benefits. Let both of them be functions of price, with the resulting
values being quantities. Thus fi (pO)
qo, f 2 (pO) = q1• The optimal equilibrium
quantity will be f 1 (pO) + f 2 (pO) = qO + q 1 = q2; but the actual quantity will
be only qo. Thus, actual/optimal= qO/q2 = / 1(pO)/[f1(pO) + f 2 (pO)]. Now, we
can define a function g such that / = g(/2 ). Then, actual/optimal = g (f 2 )/(c(f2 )
+ /2 ). Plainly, as g gets larger,1 the fraction
gets nearer to 1. Thus, as / 1 gets
larger relative to f 21 the actual quantity bought gets nearer to the optimal quanity.

=

January 1976] ·

The Allocation of Prosecution

597

The remainder of this section attempts to describe the determinants of the Bp/Be ratio for specific goods-the prosecution of
various offenses-and thus attempts to determine the relative market efficiency in allocating resources to the prosecution of the offenses. It hypothesizes that all offenses, both torts and crimes, are
prosecuted in the market-that is, by the victim of the offense. The
method of analysis employed entails several assumptions. 23 First,
it assumes that the victim can recover actual but not punitive damages in all prosecution actions. Second, it assumes that successful
prosecutions generate net external benefits for the victim and society, which is true so long as the behavior-controlling laws are just
and prosecutions are successful only when the defendant has in fact
committed the offense alleged. 24 Finally, it assumes that society has
benefited $X when an offender has compensated his victim $X,
which requires that an offender's enjoyment of his ill-gotten gains
be viewed as having no societal value. 25 The analysis views victim23. These assumptions may be oversimplifications, but they are necessary to keep
the discussion within reasonable bounds. In large measure, they should be "correct";
that is, the empirical ones describe existing facts correctly and the ethical ones express attitudes that are widely held.
24. Complications ensue when one drops the assumption that every successful
prosecution is factually proper. The result is that a private action might be either
beneficial or costly to society with respect to both private and external factors. The
damages won are a social benefit if plaintiff is right and a cost if he is wrong. The
external effects are more complicated. External benefits in the form of deterring
offenders will occur whether or not plaintiff was right because, first, potential
offenders will not know whether plaintiff was right and, second, even if plaintiff was
wrong, a judgment for plaintiff still suggests that successful prosecution of a given
offender is more likely than before. External costs are generated in so far as
frivolous, yet potentially _victorious, suits are encouraged by a plaintiff's improper
success.
25. There are several ways to vary this assumption. One can assume that, while
losses to victims are social costs, gains to offenders can in part be social benefits. If
so, a "transfer offense" like theft will present social costs in the amount of the
victim!s loss minus f times the offender's gain, where f is a fraction between O and 1.
This will result in generally lower social costs from transfer offenses and will entail a
policy of less spending to combat these offenses than will be the case under the
assumption used in the text.
.
Alternatively-one can assume the same kind of cost-offset as above but hypothesize that there is another element of social cost: whenever an offense is committed
there are "injustice costs" to society. If "injustice costs" are constant over all
offenses, this assumption will entail no changes in policy, but, if they vary, then there
will be more spending on the more unjust offenses.
Another approach is the more thoroughgoing utilitarian one of assuming that
transfers are good to the extent that total utility is increased. If one accepts the
plausible thesis that the marginal utility of money diminishes with wealth, then thefts
from the rich by the poor may provide net social benefits (although total utility can
also include increasing people's feelings of safety). This approach thus entails
separating transfer offenses by the wealth of the average offender and the average
victim. Prosecution is most desirable where the offender is wealthier than the victim
and perhaps unjustified if the offender is poorer than the victim. Using this approach,
deterrence may result in external costs as well as benefits, since a prosecution may
deter poor offenders from acting against rich victims. In short, alterations in the
assumption made in the text can significantly alter the conclusion of the analysis.
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compensation and deterrence as the goals of a prosecution. While
the analysis does not consider the goal of retribution, the model developed can apply without alteration to a legal system that places
significant emphasis on that goal. 26
The BP/Be ratio is the ratio of net private to net external benefits that would result if, for the average offense, the victim brought
or tried to bring an action against the offender. "Bringing an action" includes everything from initial settlement discussion to actual
trial of the prosecution. "Net private benefits" (Bp) to an average
individual from bringing an action is a function of the probability of
success, the various gross benefit determinants, and the various cost
determinants. This quantity can be represented as follows:
B(Pei, D, CL, Xi ••• Xn, ••• Yi • • • Yn)
Psi, with i varying from 1 through n, is the schedule of probabilities
of success27 at various levels, levels I through n, of "bringing the action." It is clear that the chances of success will vary with the level
to wltj.ch the action is pursued, and thus with the amount of resources
committed to the action by the victim. Presumably, the victim will
26. The method of analysis used here need not be altered significantly if one
concludes, as many have, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
231 (1968), that retribution requires the punishment of those who commit immoral
offenses. Because immoral offenses are generally crimes and morally neutral offenses
are generally torts, adherence to such a view appears at first blush to support the
present crime/tort distinction that separates governmental and private prosecution.
The implications of the retributive theory, however, are not so simple, but rather must
be uncovered by asking what the retributive theory demands. Hart argues that one
key ramification of the retributive theory is that the severity of the punishment must
vary with the gravity of the offense. Id. This ramification does not necessarily alter
the analysis employed in the text since the court adjudicating a prosecution can
increase the severity of the punishment by imposing a fine, whether or not prosecution is by the government. If uniform fines are viewed as unfair in the sense that
they burden the poor convicted offender more than the rich one, fines could be
tailored according to the income and wealth of the offender in the manner of a
progressive income tax. The imposition of fines in this manner would require a
change in the model developed in this Note, since B.IB. would be larger for offenses
with relatively wealthier offenders. Presumably such a change would be required
only where offenders are individuals rather than corporations. It is of course not at
all clear that uniform fines for a particular offense are unfair, since each offender,
regardless of income, profits the same from committing an offense.
If imprisonment is considered_necessary to satisfy the goal of retribution, governmental action of some sort probably will be necessary to increase private prosecution
to the optimal level. This is true since private plaintiffs may be reluctant to
prosecute an offender who will be imprisoned and wilI be therefore unlikely to satisfy
a damage judgment entered against him. No alteration in the model developed in the
text is necessary if imprisonment is deemed appropriate only for violations of offenses
characterized by the evidentiary problem. See text following note 16 supra.
In discussing retribution, Hart also mentions the "reprobative theory," id. at 235,
the theory that retribution by the state performs an act of authoritative moral
condemnation and that this state condemnation is important, either morally or as a
means of deterrence. This theory does not necessarily require alteration of the model
since the state condemns all offenses through the rulings of judges and through state
enforcement and execution of the rulings.
27. "Success" is used to mean the recovery of full damages.
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actually commit to the action that amount of resources that optimizes
his return. 28 D is the amount of damages inflicted on the victim. CL
represents the schedule of litigation costs and talces into account the
fact that litigation costs will vary with the level to which an action
is pursued. Finally, "x1 . . . Xn" are other determinants of gross
·benefits and "y1 . . . Yn" are other determinants of costs. These
dummy variables could be replaced by more specific ones, but will
not be so replaced because greater detail in the theory will not yield
any fruitful implications.
The "net external benefits" (Be) resulting from an action are
derived by analyzing the deterrent effect of the action. The prosecution of an offender imposes some costs on the offender, whether
or not the prosecution is successful, and should thus change his estimate of the probable costs and benefits from the commission of future offenses. 29 The offender will view future offenses as at least
slightly less profitable than if no action had been brought simply because his estimates of the likelihood that future actions will be
brought will depend on his past experiences. Similarly, other potential offenders will be affected to some small degree by the action
since some of them will be aware of the action and will consider it
in weighing the possible costs associated with the commission of future offenses. Put very simply, offenders will be deterred by the
action. They will commit fewer offenses and thus will inflict less
damage on third parties. This avoided damage can be viewed as
the external benefits resulting from the prosecution. 30
The quantification of these external benefits can profitably be~
gin with an analysis of the net damage caused by an average offense.
Net damage is, in general, the actual damage inflicted upon the average victim less the amount of the average victim's actual damage recovery. The average victim's damage recovery in turn depends
upon the probability that the victim will bring an action and the average damage recovery when an action is brought. Net damage can
therefore be quantified as follows:
D-PJ [B' (P's!, D, CL, Xi • • • Xn, Yi • • • Yn)]

D is the actual damage inflicted upon the average victim. PJ is the
probability that the victim will bring an action. The B' function,
which is similar to but differs in significant ways from the B function,
28. That is, the amount of resources expended is the amount that minimizes a loss
function for the plaintiff, which function depends on the amount of damages in the
case, the plaintifrs chances of recovering, and the costs of recovering.
29. Offenders may be able to insure themselves against liability. Such a practice
would change somewhat the costs incurred by offenders who lose suits, but not the
general pattern of those costs. If an offender commits an offense in period t and is
prosecuted, his insurance premiums in period t + 1 will cost him more.
30. Landes and Posner appear to realize that there can be externalities from
deterrence, but do not take the point any further. See Landes & Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4J. LEGALSTµD.29 (1975).
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is the average expected benefits that result in actions that are actually brought. B' is a function of P's1, the probability of success in
actions that are actually brought, and of D, the victims' damages, Ct,
:the litigation costs, "x1 . . . Xn," the various benefit determinants,
-and "y1 . . . Yn," the cost determinants. B' differs from B in that
B is the average benefits that would result if an action were brought
for every offense. To phrase it differently, B is the benefits that
the average victim can expect to recover, with the averaging process
including not only instances where an action has some likelihood of
success, but also instances where the action is likely to result in a
net cost to the victim. PiB' (. . . ) is the average net recovery by
the victim for each offense and is obtained in effect by multiplying
the average recovery in cases actually brought by the likelihood that
an action will be brought. PJB' (. . . ) will be greater than or equal
to B, assuming that victims bring actions when it is profitable to do
so, because the averaging undertaken to determine PJB' (. . . ) excludes actions that would be unprofitable to the victim. 31
The next step in quantifying the external benefits is to analyze
the deterrent .effect of an action, that is, the diminution, caused by
the prosecution, in the probability that offenders will commit offenses. 32 An action deters both the offender against whom the action is brought (special deterrence) and other potential offenders
(general deterrence). The amount of deterrence turns on whether
the aotion is successful, although, because the defendant must expend resources to defend any action, some deterrence occurs even
if the action is unsuccessful. Special deterrence can be quantitified
as follows:

+

Per Pdl1
(l-Pe1) Pd31
As above, Psi, for i equals 1 through n, is ,the probability of success
schedule for actions brought for every case. Pdu is the change in

the likelihood that •the defendant will discontinue offending that results from a successful action brought against him. Because of the
31. The following example elucidates the distinction between B and PJB' (, • ,),
Assume that 10 offenses occur. If actions are brought to redress 2 of the offenses
and $10 are recovered in each, P1 is 2/10, B' is $10, and PJB'(, •. ) is $2. Assume
that, if the eight remaining offenses had been prosecuted, $5 would have been
recovered in one, $5 would have been lost in each of five, and $10 would have been
lost in each of two. B therefore is the total benefits and costs from the prosecutions,
$(20), divided by the number of <?ffenses, 10, for a result of $(2),
32. A subtle distinction must be made to understand the deterrence factor. The
P.i variable measures not the absolute deterrability of an offender, but rather the
offender's response to increases in costs of offending; it measures incremental rather
than total deterrence. On the basis of his life experiences, A may be more deterred
by the general specter of law enfor<;ement than B, but B may be more affected by a
change in the amount of law enforcement. B possesses a higher value for Pd, Put
another way, if Y equals aX plus b, where Y is the amount of deterrence and X the
amount of law enforcement, here we are interested in a, the slope of the line, not in b,
the intercept.

January 1976]

601

The Allocation of Prosecution

variance of the costs of litigation and of the probable damage recovery, Pdu varies (from i equals 1 through n) with the level to
which the action is pursued by the victim before it is successful.
(l-Pa1) is, of course, the probability that the action will be unsuccessful, and P da1 is the change in the likelihood that the defendant will
discontinue offending that results from an unsuccessful action, with
both figures varying from i equals 1 through n according to the level
to which the action is pursued before the victim concludes that it
is unsuccessful. In short, special deterrence is the sum of the deterrent effect of a successful action times the probability that the action
will be successful and the deterrent effect of an unsuccessful action
times the probability that the action will be unsuccessful.
The amount of general deterrence can be derived similarly. Each
potential offender is deterred as follows:
P.st Pc121
(l-Pa1) Pd41
This quantification is the same as the quantification of special deterrence except that P d21 and P d4t refer to the deterrence of offenders
other than the defendant that results from successful and unsuccessful prosecutions respectively. Total general deterrence is therefore
K [P"'1 Pc121
(l-Pa1) Pd41]
where K is the total number .of potential offenders. The sum of the
specific and general deterrence is the total deterrent effect of the
action:
[Psi Pdu
(1-Pa1) Pdai]
K [Pel Pc121
(1-Pe1) Pd4i]
This can be simplified algebraically to:
P.1 (Pdu
KPd21)
(l-P.1) (Pda1
KPd4t)
It is at this point possible to quantify the net external benefits
flowing from an action. The only additional factor that must be
added is N, the number of future offenses that the average potential
offender was likely to commit before the action at issue was brought.
Total net external benefits (Be) are therefore:
[P.1 (Pdu
KPd21)
(l-Ps1) (Pdst
KPd4t)]
N[D-PJ B' (P's1, D, CL, X1 . . . Xn, Y1 . . . Yn)]
These quantitative formulations of BP and Be can be employed
to determine what factors influence the BP/Be ratio, and thus market
efficiency. All the "P" variables-Psi, P's1, PJ, and the Pis-are between O and 1 since they represent probabilities and changes in probabilities. The quantity D- pj B' (P's1, D, CL, Xt • • • Xn, Yi • .. Yn) is
positive since the average net recovery in instances where an action
is brought, discounted by the lik-elihood that an action will be brought,
is clearly less than the average amount of damages inflicted upon
the victim ( assuming no punitive damage recovery).
At this point, several factors can be isolated that make the Be
for one offense greater than the Be for another, and thus make possible a comparison of relative market efficiency in allocating resources
for the prosecution of the offenses. The most important factor is

+

+

+

+

+

+
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+
+

+

+
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deterrence. As the Pis increase, Be increases without any corresponding effect on Bp. Thus, with all other factors equal, the market is least efficient for those offenses deterred •the most by the proscution of offenders. Two other factors clearly affecting BP/Bo are
the number of potential offenders and the average number of offenses committed by each offender. If other factors are equal, Bo
increases as these factors increase, and thus the market becomes less
efficient. CL, the costs of litigation, is the final factor with a determinate effect on BP/Be. An increase in CL makes B and thus
BP smaller. It also lowers the value of B', and Be becomes larger.
The net effect, therefore, is that BP/Be decreases with an increase in
CL.33
The effects of differences in Pai are more difficult to determine.
An increase in Pai has a positive influence on the B function since
the average net benefits from an action increase with an increase
in the probability of success. Thus, an increase in Pai increases Bp,
But an increase in Pai has an indeterminate effect on Be, as can be
seen from the deterrence formulation as originally devised:
[Psi Pdll

+

(1-Pa1) Pdat]

+ K[Pa1

Pd21

+

(1-Pat) Pd4t]

Because deterrence is greater for successful actions than for unsuccessful actions, Pd11 is greater than Pdat and Pd21 is greater than Pd4I,
Thus, an increase in Pai would increase the entire deterrence formulation and thus Be, But an increase in Psi, which would be accompanied by an increase in P's1, which would tend to decrease Be, Consequently, an increase in Pai has an indeterminate effect on Be and
thus on the Bp/Be ratio.
The same indeterminacy is present with respect to the effect of
D, the average damages inflicted upon the victim. An increase in
D increases BP by increasing the average damage recovery of the
victim, but it also increases Be by increasing the net social cost of
the offenses that have been deterred. The effect on BP/Be, therefore, is unclear. 34
To summarize, there are four factors that have determinate effects on comparative market efficiency in allocating resources for the
prosecution of various offenses: the deterrent effect of a prosecution, the number of potential offenders, the average number of future offenses per potential offender, and the schedule of litigation
costs. 35
33. One other factor that has a clear effect is Pi, the probability that an offense
will be followed by a prosecution. If Pi for one offense is greater than Pi for a
second, with other factors equal, the average social cost caused per offense will be
less for the first (since PiB(P.1, x 1 • • • Xn, y1 • • • Yn) will be greater), and thus
B. will be less. Consequently, as Pi increases without alteration of the other factors,
market efficiency increases. This is of little significance, however, since a change in
Pi will always have been stimulated by a change in another variable.
34. D will have a positive effect on both B and B'. The effect on Bp/B. then
remains indeterminate.
35. It is worthwhile to look briefly at the effect of the imposition of punitive
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Before examining these factors and considering various offenses
in light of these factors, a theory of government misallocation must
be developed. 36 As noted above, 37 there are several reasons why
a representative government cannot efficiently and without bias collect, aggregate, and implement the preferences of voters regarding
individual allocation decisions. Most sources .of government error
in the allocation of resources for the prosecution of offenses do not
vary with the different types of offenses. But one significant source
of error-the influence of offenders on the legislative and administrative decision-making processes--does vary among offenses. Persons who frequently commit a particular offense are apt to exert influence to limit the frequency of prosecution of those who commit
the offense. Government, as a consequence, may under-allocate resources for the prosecution of these offenses. 38
This source of government error varies among offenses in two
ways. First, some offenses possess a moral stigma such that lobbying against their prosecution is effectively prohibited. For example,
it is difficult to imagine embezzlers lobbying for lessened prosecution. It is much less difficult to imagine the National Manufacturers'
Association working, perhaps quasi-surreptitiously, to limit products
liability prosecutions. The difference between these situations is
that political influence is deemed. legitimate for some purposes but
not for others.
Second, the relative amount of government error varies with the
relative influence of the individual victims and offenders. If, for a
given offense, the offender's gain from the offense is substantially
less than the victim's loss, the former will have less at stake and
thus presumably will exert less effort toward influencing government
prosecution patterns. More significantly, as Mancur Olson has
damages on the model. Let F equal some fine imposed on defendants found liable
and paid to winning plaintiffs. Then the B./B. equation looks like this for a court
system that imposes such fines:
(B ( ••• )
F)/[P.1 (Pd1t
K Pd21)
(l-P.1) (Pd3l
KPd41)JN[D-PiB' (. • .) -

+

PiFJ

+

+

+

The deterrence variables are new ones, since they depend on the level of the fine.
A positive F will increase private benefits and increase the amount of deterrence, but
will decrease the benefits from deterrence, N[. . .]. Therefore, external benefits,
and thus the ratio of private to external benefits, will be affected in an uncertain way
by the imposition of punitive damages.
36. The following discussion in the text deals only with governmental prosecution
of offenses under existing laws. Changing the substantive law is not at issue since it
is an option under either public or private prosecution.
37. See text at notes 5-8 supra.
38. One cannot speak of "good" forces that balance the offenders' influence in
the political process and lead to efficiency. That is because these "good" forcescitizens wishing to combat offenses-are merely part of an efficient governmental
process under the view, _invoked here, of government as a quasi-market body that
merely transforms proper citizen preferences into policy. Anything influencing
government other than citizens working for their legitimate preferences will tend to
result in error relative to this "efficient" process.
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pointed out in The Logic of Collective Action, 39 large groups seeking collective goods, goods with largely external benefits, will not
succeed in obtaining the goods as well as smaller groups seeking similar goods because the free-rider problem will be more severe for
the former. Political pressure groups, Olson demonstrates, fit into
this analysis. Thus, small pressure groups of a given total power will
work more effectively than large groups of the same total power.
This analysis explains why producers' lobbies are more politically
significant than consumers' lobbies, despite the fact that each side
has the same amount at stake in a particular controversy. Its significance in this context is that a small group of frequent offenders
or victims is more likely to be influential than a larger group of minor
ones. Thus, relative size of victim and offender is a significant variable here.
In sum, governmental misallocation of resources for the prosecution of an offense is influenced by •the moral stigma attaching to the
offense and the relative size and thus political influence of the offender and the victim. 40
IV.

ALLOCATING THE PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION ,

The second model developed above is admittedly abstract and
cannot, absent empirical input, yield concrete conclusions that might
lead us to change current policy. One way to operationalize such
a model is to estimate the variables using rigorous quantitative techniques. For instance, regression analysis could be employed to uncover the factors that influence deterrence. For lack of sufficient
empirical data, this Note employs a more casual analysis, filling in
the variables by a series of informed guesses. These speculations
suggest some useful policy initiatives and highlight some fruitful
prospects for further, more sophisticated, investigation.
Of the determinants isolated above that influence market and
governmental efficiency in allocating resources for prosecutions, deterrence is the one that must first be examined. The likelihood that
a potential offender will be deterred by a particular prosecution appears to turn on five factors: first, the amount of resources that the
potential offender devotes to information-gathering, which affects
the likelihood that he will learn of the prosecution; second, whether
he weighs costs and benefits carefully before committing an offense;
third, his degree of risk aversion; fourth, whether he is a habitual
offender; and, fifth, the "moral severity" of the offense that he potentially will commit. 41 These factors must be understood in order to
compare offenses according to their Pd factors.
39. See M. OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 60-66, 125-48 (1965).
40. See also text at notes 5-8 supra.
41. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWXINS, supra note 10, at 98-118.
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The first factor influencing the deterrent effect of a prosecution
is the amount of resources devoted by the average offender to
gather information about prosecution trends. This factor is in large
measure a function of the number of offenses the offender commits
and the value to him of committing an offense. The more offenses
that a potential offender is likely to commit and the more he gains
from each, the greater the likelihood that he will be prosecuted and
that he will, because of a prosecution, be forced to forgo committing
future profitable offenses. Consequently, the greater the total value
to the offender of the offenses he commits, the more money he optimally will spend to avoid the harm from prosecution;42 that is, •the
more he will spend trying to avoid being prosecuted and, if prosecuted, convicted. One aspect of ensuring safety from prosecution
involves informing oneself about the likelihood of prosecution. An
offender must understand -the extent of the danger before he can
act profitably. In short, more is optimally spent in gathering information where total offenses are monetarily more significant.
This factor, in an understandable manner, distinguishes offenses
on the basis of the average benefit to the offender of committing
an offense. In a manner less clear and in need of further explication, the factor distinguishes offenses on the basis of the nuniber of
offenses committed. The amount of resources committed to information-gathering could vary with -the number of offenses of a particular kind that are committed by a whole "industry," without regard
to the characteristics of individual offenders. Or, it could vary with
the number of offenses of a particular kind committed by each individual offender. 43 That the last of these two variations is correct
is not difficult to demonstrate. Suppose there are ten instances of
defective products manufactured each year and ten instances of misrepresentation, and that the prospects for harm to offenders from
prosecution are the same per offense for both industries. Assume
also that the costs of providing information about the prospects of
prosecution are the same for both. Assume finally that one offender
commits all ten "products liability" torts while ten different people
commit the acts of misrepresentation.
In which industry is more information gathered? One might argue that, if the productivity from information-gathering is the same
for the two industries, each industry will expend the same amount.
Assuming that each of the two offenses is equally beneficial to the
42. As characterized by Becker in Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 169 (1968), this is a cost-minimizing situation. One
minimizes total cost by minimizing the sum of the cost from that activity and the cost
of preventing the activity. The optimal amount of prevention is that amount at
which the marginal cost of prevention equals the marginal cost of activity.
43. Note that, while the resources devoted to information-gathering depend on the
number of offenses committed per "industry," the information actually gathered, as
the following discussion in the text points out, may not.
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offender, the optimal amount spent per offense will be •the same in
each industry, $X, and thus the manufacturer of defective products
will spend $10X and each misrepresenter, $X. Optimally, the misrepresenters will not duplicate their efforts. Instead, a firm will
come into being to provide the information they need, the $1 OX will
be paid to the firm, and each misrepresenter will receive the firm's
total product of information for the price of $X. This total product
will be the same as gathered by the single manufacturer of defective
products since the revenue to the information-gatherer is the same
in each case. 44
This optimal situation, however, is unlikely to occur. The information firm can supply the same information to all ten misrepresenters because information is a "social good": A's use of the information does not preclude B's use of it. But for this very reason, the
firm will not be able to maintain its market. When its information
is sold to misrepresenter A, he may sell it himself to B at a price
less than $X. And B, in turn, may sell it or even give it to C. This
problem, similar in effect to the free-rider problem, means that a
market may not exist that is sufficiently profitable for an information-gathering firm to come into existence. Even if such a firm does
arise, it may not face the same demand for its product, and thus will
not gather as much information, as does the single manufacturer of
defective products who does not have these transaction problems.
The relevant variables isolated by this first factor for determining
which offenses are most easily deterred, therefore, are the number
of offenses committed by the average offender, the benefit to the
offender of committing an offense, and the resources the offender
has available for information-gathering. Large, frequent offenders
committing profitable offenses will spend more on information-gathering, learn more, and thus be more deterrable.
The relationship between the frequency with which an offender
commits an offense and his deterrability probably is not continuous,
for threshold effects are likely to exist. If an offender has few resources to devote to information-gathering, he may be limited to efforts such as acquiring information by word of mouth, reading periodicals of mass circulation, and perhaps personal library research,
measures ,that for many offenses may not be worthwhile. Effective
measures, notably hiring attorneys to investigate the chances of prosecution thoroughly, require resources beyond the means of many offenders.45 One time, infrequent, and even frequent but small offend44. The solution may be more complex depending on the nature of the demand
curve for information on the part of these firms, but the statement in the text is at
least roughly true.
45. The government and "public" agencies, like law reviews, publish information
relevant to offenders, but it is not organized and analyzed sufficiently to be of use to
an offender in making his decision. General Motors, for example, still needs lawyers
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ers, therefore, might for some offenses be lumped together in the
category of having no worthwhile information available to them. For
such offenses, large, highly active offenders are likely to be the only
offenders at all well informed. A small restauranteur, for example,
probably does nothing to investigate his chances of being sued for
spoiled food even though hes may be ai fairly frequent offender.
Changes in the local climate are therefore unlikely to affect him.
Very active offenders have another advantage that ensures them
more information than others. Such offenders may supply a large
enough fraction of the total "market" for a given offense that trends
in prosecution will become apparent simply from the prosecutions
that they themselves face. General Motors lawyers, for example,
know about trends in products liability prosecutions without having
to research the issue.
The second factor relevant in determining the relative deterrability of particular offenses is the care employed by offenders in
weighing the costs and benefits from offending. If offenders for a
particular offense do not consider the benefits and •the costs of committing the offense before acting, the prospect of a greater penalty
will not deter them. The better an offender understands the costs
and benefits from a given act, the more likely he is to respond to
a change in those parameters.
This second factor can be broken down into several separate elements. One threshold element is that an offender must analyze his
activities. In Zimring's terms, he must be reflective rather than impulsive. 46 If an offender does not reflect on the impact of his activities, even past activities, he will never have considered their costs.
Another element is whether an offender attempts to quantify costs
and benefits. Quantification need not be precise, but even rough
quantification is more accurate than mere estimates of costs as being
"high" or "low." The more detailed an offender is in quantifying
costs and benefits, the more likely he is to notice and respond to
cost and benefit changes. A third element is whether an offender
plans ahead, whether he is "future-oriented" in Zimring's jargon. 47
This second factor singles out most clearly those offenses that
grow out of an offender's economic activity. Businessmen tend to
analyze future actions because of their habitual use of accountants
and accounting procedures and their need ·to justify projects to investors and lenders. Large organizations are particularly analytical
because their project decisions, more institutionalized; and impersonal, are based less on individual judgments and more on numbers
to read the law review articles and government statistics, to talk to people in
government, and to collate this data to define the problems facing General Motors.
46. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINs, supra note 10, at 106-08.
47. Id. at 98-99.
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and -hard data. Regular forecasts and plans assure that large organizational offenders are future-oriented. A distinction must be
drawn, however, between a business or businessman who commits
offenses in the regular course of business and a person who commits business offenses. The former is one whose business activities
incidentally include the commission of offenses. He may well evaluate offending as just another business decision, and, if so, the above
analysis applies. The latter offender, characterized by one committing a large scale sales fraud or perpetrating a land fraud scheme,
is quite different. His decision to offend is probably not made with
the aid of accounting procedures or institutionalized planning since
it is an initial decision rather than a decision made in the context
of a series of business decisions. Such an offender cannot be expected to engage in a careful evaluation of costs and benefits before
acting. 48
The third factor in determining Pd for a particular offense is the
risk preferences of the offenders. Often a pattern of committing offenses is "risky" in that ·there is some possibility of large resulting
losses. An offender risks having to reimburse the victim for the
damages he suffers, which may be well in excess of the offender's
profit from offending, and he also risks having to pay litigation expenses. A series of such losses from several offenses may be catastrophic, and the possibility of catastrophic loss will exist even though
the offender's profit from offending exceeds his expected prosecution losses.
Different offenders will view this schedule of possible losses differently. Some will be "risk averse" in the sense that they will base
their decisions not on the expected value of their activities 40 but
rather on the possibility of catastrophic losses. Risk averse offenders will tend to be more affected by a change in the likelihood of
prosecution than will those who base their decisions on expected
value because the likelihood of catastrophic losses is more affected
by such a change than is the value of expected losses. 60 A numerical example illustrates this point. Suppose an offender faces a SO
per cent chance of 1 and a SO per cent chance of 2 prosecutions
against him in a given period. For each prosecution, he faces a 33
48. Such an offender would be more reflective than, say, an ax murderer, but
crimes of passion seem in general to possess the evidentiary problem and thus are not
included within this analysis.
49. "Expected value" is a statistical term meaning, roughly, the "average" prospect
in a situation. If I engage in a coin-flipping game where I win $1 if the coin comes
up heads and lose $1 if it comes up tails, the expected value of the game is 1/z times
1 minus ½ times 1 equals 0. The expected value of the game is that I will break
even. There is a risk, however, that I will lose.
50. Strictly speaking, this is true only for distributions, like the normal one, that
have low frequencies at the extremes and higher ones near the median. But intuition
suggests that this is almost certainly the case here. It is considered to be the case in
most social populations.
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per cent chance of winning the suit, .a 33 per cent chance of settling
for half of the plaintiff's damages; and a 33 per cent chance of losing.
For the sake of simplicity, litigation costs are ignored and losses are
measured as 0, 5, and 10, respectively. Thus the offender faces a
probability distribution of his possible losses. There is roughly a 22
per cent chance -that he loses nothing during the period, and a 5¼
per cent chance that he loses 20. The expected value of his losses
is 7¼. 151 Suppose the chance of prosecution goes up so that there
is a 50 per cent chance of two suits and a 50 per cent chance of
three. The chance of losing 20 or more has risen to 24 per cent,
or an increase by a factor of 4. The expected loss value, however,
has risen only 67 per cent, to 12¼. The implications of this difference are clear. A risk averse party, one who bases his actions
primarily on the chance of losing a large amount (20 in this case),
will be affected by the change in prosecution far more than one who
simply relies on expected values. Thus, more deterrence results
from an incremental increase in the probability of prosecution where
offenders for a particular offense are risk averse.
Recent economic literature convincingly shows that large corporations are typically risk averse. 52 In The New Industrial State, Galbraith argues that the large industrial corporation is impelled by the
large capital investments and long lead time required by modern
technology to plan accurately far ahead and to keep uncertainty to
a minimum. 53 Large losses and surprises cannot be tolerated because adjustments to deal with them cannot be made on short notice.
The Galbraith argument suggests that, because the termination of
a loss-incurring program might be slow and costly, a large firm will
be averse to a program that might engender a large number of losing
suits. Robin Marris concludes that large corporations are risk averse
on the ground that corporate managers, motivated primarily by their
own survivial, run corporations to minimize the danger of large losses
and thus takeover bids: they fear the chance of severe losses much
more than they desire big gains. 54
It may also be true that risk aversion varies among individuals
according to their income levels. One who is poor may be a risk
preferrer because he has very little to lose and the bankruptcy and
welfare laws limit the consequences of his failures. On such an individual, an incremental increase in the probability of prosecution
may have little effect.
51. Disregarding, of course, the offender's earlier gains from offending.
52. See, e.g., K. BOULDING, RECONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMICS 26-38 (1950); Grabowski & Mueller, Managerial and Stockholder Welfare Models of Firm Expenditures
in REv. EcoN. STAT., Feb. 1972, at 9-20.
53. See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 11-178 (1967).
54. R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM 29-45
(1964).
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The fourth factor affecting Pd is a simple one. Pd is the diminished probability of an offender's continuing to offend. If an offender acts once, from impulse or for peculiar reasons, and is unlikely to repeat, Pd may be small simply because there will be little
likelihood of repetition even without prosecution. Thus, whether
the average offender for a particular offense is a habitual one influences Pd,
The final factor -affecting Pd is the moral seriousness of the offense. The responsiveness of offenders to a change in the probability of prosecution should vary inversely with this factor. If an offense is considered highly reprehensible, most people will be barred
by their ethical beliefs from committing it and a small change in the
expected costs of offending will not affect their decisions. But, if
an offense is viewed as having little moral significance, many will
base their decision whether to offend on the chance of prosecution.
It is -at this point possible, after analyzing the five main factors
that influence deterrence, to list the characteristics that make an offense most suitable for governmental prosecution. An offense is an
attractive one for governmental prosecution if (1) there are a large
number of potential offenders, (2) each offender commits a large
number of offenses, (3) offenders are large, active, and financially
able to gather information, (4) offenders are reflective or commit offenses in the regular course of business, (5) offenders are risk
averse, as are large businesses and perhaps individuals in upper income brackets, (6) the offense is not one that is particularly morally
reprehensible, and (7) the offense involves complicated trials with
complex issues of law and fact and thus leads to high litigation costs.
While various offenses will rate differently on this list of considerations, the list does seem to single out as the most suitable for governmental prosecution those offenses that are committed frequently
by a large number of financially strong businesses, expensive to litigate, and not morally reprehensible. The prosecution of such offenses will create large external benefits and will thus have a low
BP/Be ratio, which means that, absent government intervention, the
market will allocate considerably less than the optimal amount of resources for prosecution.
Yet, as noted above, governmental misallocation is greatest for
offenses that are committed by large businesses and that are not
morally reprehensible, which means that governmental misallocation
is severe for many of the offenses for which market misallocation
is great. In the antitrust area, for example, where offenders are
principally large corporations and the offense not particularly morally
reprehensible, governmental misallocation is evidenced by the apparent forestalling of a number of justice department prosecutions
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due to corporate political influence. 55 Thus, the fact that an offense
is morally neutral and committed primarily by large corporations
does not automatically mean that government will allocate resources
to the prosecution of the offense more accurately than the free market will. The determination that the market will misallocate resources for the prosecution of a particular offense must therefore be
followed by a balancing of the relative inefficiencies of governmental
and market production.
An alternative to governmental prosecution of offenses that will
be under-prosecuted by the free market is governmental subsidization of private prosecution. 56 A subsidy program would only increase private prosecution. Even if the decision concerning the
amount by which prosecutions should be subsidized were influenced
by politically oriented offenders, a subsidy program would not augment existing market underallocation. Thus, while governmental
misallocation renders it impossible to determine whether, for a particular offense, governmental prosecution would be better than private prosecution, governmental misallocation does not affect the decision whether an offense is an appropriate one for governmental
subsidization. It is therefore possible to state that an offense insufficiently prosecuted in the market, like an offense involving large business offenders, is a strong candidate for governmental subsidization.
Five common offenses can at this point be ranked according to
their relative suitability for market prosecution and governmental
subsidization of private prosecution. While -the ranking will be
rough and far from rigorous, it should serve to hint at what can be
achieved by using the model here developed fortified by more empirical knowledge.
The five offenses considered are antitrust violations, manufacturers' products liability offenses, interference with contract, sales
fraud, and embezzlement. Sales fraud and embezzlement, and to
some extent antitrust violations, are now prosecuted by the government. An examination of the five offenses for the characteristics
isolated above suggests that two of these three-sales fraud and embezzlement-are not the most appropriate offenses for governmental
prosecution or subsidization.
Antitrust violations are the most appropriate of the five offenses
for governmental action. Because violations are highly significant
55. M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 30-47 (1972).
56. The subsidy would be a bonus paid by the government to individuals who
prosecuted successfully, and would be received by the individuals in addition to the
damages awarded by the court. The size of the bonuses would roughly equal the
external benefits from prosecution. A bonus equal to external benefits would mean
that the successful prosecutor would receive an amount equal to all the benefits
generated by the prosecution. Thus there would be sufficient inducement for the
optimum amount of prosecution to be achieved.
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in dollar terms, 57 there is an incentive for potential offenders to be
well-informed as to the possibilities of prosecution. Potential violators are reasonably large. in number and are principally large
firms 58 that presumably expend a vast amount of resources on planning. Many potential offenders are therefore probably also risk
averse. Antitrust violations characteristically take years and cadres
of lawyers to prosecute; thus, litigation costs are high. Finally, antitrust violations are probably not regarded by the business community
as immoral. 59 Because the antitrust laws and their justification are
still a matter of controversy, it is reasonable to surmise that most
potential offenders are willing to offend if the risks are small enough.
Products liability offenses are second in terms of their propriety
for governmental subsidization. The number of potential offenders
is large, each is apt to commit a large number of offenses, and problems of proof may make the costs of litigation significant. Moreover, offenders risk the possibility of large losses since the costs of
being prosecuted for products liability oftep. include enormous personal injury judgments. Thus, offenders have incentives to be wellinformed. Finally, products liability violations may possess little
moral significance, principally because offenses are unintentional. A
fim1 becomes an offender by using slightly less thorough manufacturing or testing procedures and accepting a slightly greater probability that defective products will be produced. Because there is
always some finite probability of defectives, it is easy to consider
such actions as morally neutral. Yet defective products often cause
serious injuries. Some firms may thus take great care to avoid producing defective goods whatever the chance of prosecution. The
only factor that reduces the attractiveness of products liability offenses for governmental action is the size of the potential offenders.
While many of the offenders are apt to be large, aware of prosecution trends, reflective, and risk averse, many offenders may be small
businesses with little risk aversion and little institutionalized planning.
Little that is certain can be said with respect to the third offense,
interference with contract. Presumably, few businessmen induce
breaches of contract as a regular procedure and thus few have any
real incentive for staying well-informed concerning the offense.
While offenders will generally be businesses there is no a priori reason to believe that any particular proportion are large corporations.
57. Defendants are liable to private plaintiffs for treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970). Remedies can also include divestiture. See United States v. Aluminum Co.,
91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Plainly a divestiture order can cause an offender
significant damage.
58. Cf. P • .AREEDA, .ANTITRUST ANALYSIS xxix-li (2d ed. 1974) (citing cases).
59. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 158 (1970),
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The offense is probably not considered highly immoral by many, although some might avoid committing the offense on ethical grounds.
There are a large number of potential offenders, but most offenders
probably commit few offenses. Finally, the costs of litigation are
normally not particularly high since contract actions are not among
the more complex. In sum, interference with contract is not suited
clearly for either market or governmental treatment, and is, accordingly, ranked in a rough manner in the middle of the five offenses.
The fourth offense, sales fraud, encompasses schemes specifically designed to sell tangible or intangible items under false pretenses or in misleading ways. The offense is defined here to exclude cases that involve ·the evidentiary problem. Offenders may be
active on a large scale or they may be small operators who cannot
afford to spend what is necessary to discover the chances of prosecution. Because offending is not part of a regular business, planning
cannot be expected and, accordingly, offenders are not likely to be
risk averse. Offenses are probably regarded as highly immoral.
Thus, there will be few potential offenders on the margin of offending. Over-all, there are few external benefits flowing from a sales
fraud prosecution, and therefore there is little reason for governmental prosecution or subsidization.
Embezzlement, the final offense, has fewest of the characteristics
•that make an offense an attractive candidate for governmental action. There are probably few offenders active enough to make systematic information-gathering worthwhile.· Due to the nature of the
offense, there are no large corporate offenders and offenses are not
committed in the context of corporate decision-making. Because offenses are generally viewed as highly immoral, the number of potential offenders is not high, although some offenders may be habitual
or reflective. In sum, embezzlement, assuming that it does not possess the evidentiary problem, provides the weakest case for governmental aid of any of the five offenses considered. Yet, along with
sales fraud, it is the one predominantly prosecuted by the government.
This analysis suggests some changes in policy. Whether the government should intervene in -the prosecution of all these offenses or
none of them is a question beyond the scope of this Note. But, if
the above analysis has any validity, the present pattern of governmental intervention seems improper to ·the extent that government
does not focus on large corporate and business offenders committing
morally neutral offenses. Extending and improving the approach
used here could reveal more inconsistencies in public policy regarding the agent of prosecution.

